Busts after periods of prolonged prosperity have been found to be catastrophic. Financial institutions increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that were previously considered risky. This results from institutions rationally updating their expectations and becoming more optimistic about the future prospects of the economy. Default is inevitably harsher when a bad shock occurs after periods of good news. Commonly used measures to forecast risk in the system, such as VIX, fail to do so, as they are biased by optimistic expectations. Competition among financial institutions for better relative performance exacerbates the boom-bust cycle.
Introduction
Business cycles have received much attention in the economics literature. Stabilizing productivity and demand shocks has been at the center of modern theory. The financial crisis of 2007 has shed light on a another theory focusing on credit cycles, which argues that net expansion in credit yields economic expansions, while net contraction causes recessions, and if it persists, depressions. The pioneer of this view was Irving Fisher, who suggested a Debt-Deflation theory of Great Depressions in his 1933 paper. His analysis is based on two fundamental principles, over-indebtedness and deflation. He argued that over-indebtedness can result in deflation in future periods and that can cause liquidation of collateralised debt. Debt is denominated in nominal terms and thus is constant, whereas the value of the collateral that secures this debt depends on demand and supply in the relevant markets. This theory brings financial intermediation to the center of attention. The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between the leverage cycle and financial stability.
A number of papers have followed the debt-deflation theory of financial amplification to analyse the effect of collateral constraints on borrowing, production and eventually financial stability. In a seminal paper, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) modeled a collateral-driven credit constraint, introducing strong informational asymmetries, whereby the firm is only able to obtain fully collateralised loans. Hence, the value of the firm's assets has to be greater than the value of the loan or at the limiting case equal to it. Due to the important assumption of scarcity of assets and capital, the amount of credit to the firm shrinks in the presence of deflationary pressures on the prices of its assets. This introduces an external finance premium, which increases with a decrease in the relative price of capital. In turn, an increase in the cost of capital will result in a decrease in investment and capital usage and a reduction in GDP. Mendoza (2006 Mendoza ( , 2010 and Mendoza and Smith (2006) develop a debt-deflation theory of Sudden Drops. Geanakoplos (2003) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) show how the arrival of bads news about the future economic prospects results in a reduction in the price of assets used as collateral and leads to a drying up of liquidity and fire-sales externalities. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show how the borrowing capacity of agents, i.e. funding liquidity, and the pricing of assets, i.e. market liquidity, interact and how an idiosyncratic liquidity shock can lead to fire-sales and the unravelling of the whole market. Other papers, which model fire-sales due to adverse productivity or funding shocks to capture debt-deflationary effects on asset prices leading to loss spirals and financial instability, include Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Suarez and Sussman (1997) , Kyle and Xiong (2001), Morris and Shin (2004) , Guembel and Sussman (2010) . Adrian and Shin (2009) show this channel empirically for financial institutions.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the risk-taking behaviour of financial institutions over the leverage cycle. The main question we tackle is whether high leverage is accompanied with more risk-taking. Our thesis is akin to Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis (1992) . The second theorem 1 of the hypothesis states that over periods of prolonged prosperity and optimism about future prospects, financial institutions invest in riskier assets, which can make the economic system more vulnerable in the case that default materializes. Our findings support Minsky's view. Expectations over the cycle are the main driving force behind over-leveraging and investing in riskier projects.
When agents observe a good realization they update their expectations upwards. Not only financial institutions, but also their creditors are Bayesian learners and learn the true riskiness of projects over time. They are not asymmetrically informed, but both have incomplete information about the true probability of good and bad outcomes. Thus, after a period of good realizations, riskier projects become more appealing to financial institutions, which increase their borrowing to expand their balance sheet. Creditors are willing to provide credit at lower interest rates, since the prospects of the economy have improved from their perspective as well. This results in much higher defaults and financial instability once a bad state realizes.
We also analyse the effect of banking competition on risk-taking behaviour. Following Bhattacharya et al. (2007), we assume that financial institutions compete for higher expected returns, thus care about their relative performance. We show that they will rebalance their portfolios towards riskier assets, but with higher expected profitability, after a shorter period of good news when competition 1 We do not address his first theorem that "the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable[. . .] furthermore, if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint[. . .]units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values". The theorem is closely related to Fisher Debt-Deflation theory. Lin et al. (2010) examine the debt deflation effects of monetary policy on collateral values, default and aggregate output. for expected returns is higher. The expectations channel is more pronounced in our analysis than the relative performance one. However, our results on the latter sheds some light on why financial institutions expanded their balance sheets so rapidly before the financial crisis of 2007. The rationale behind the relative performance effect can come from the fact that managerial incentives are tied to higher performance or from reputational consideration and access to the capital markets. Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis can be found in the mutual funds literature, for example in Chevalier and Elison (1997) and Dasgupta and Prat (2006) . Cogley and Sargent (2008) use a similar learning model to provide an explanation for the equity premium puzzle by modelling a period of persistent pessimism caused by the Great Depression.
They also consider agents that have incomplete information about the true transition probabilities across good and bad states of consumption growth. Boz and Mendoza (2010) also consider a learning model in which agents update their expectations about the leverage constraint that will prevail in the future. They show the interaction between borrowing constraints and the mispricing of risk.
A sequence of periods characterised by low borrowing constraints induces optimistic expectations about the continuation of such regimes and leads to the underpricing of risk, high leverage, over inflated collateral values and a sharp collapse after a realization of a tighter constraint.
In our model, borrowing regimes are endogenous and depend on the willingness of financial institutions to invest in projects and on the interest rates creditors charge for extending credit. The interest rates are endogenously set to capture beliefs about future credit risk. Projects' payoffs do not change over time. What changes is the perceived belief about good realizations. This allows us to examine shifts in banking portfolios from safer to riskier assets and evaluate the measures used to identify the leverage cycle. The implications of our approach are the same as those in the literature on fire-sales once a bad shock realizes. Default materializes and the financial system becomes fragile. In this sense, we extend the existing theories by arguing that it is optimistic expectations that result in over-leveraging and exacerbate the negative effect of bad realizations on financial stability.
It is not bad news that threaten the resilience of the system. It is prolonged prosperity that makes bad news have such a negative effect. 2 This has important implications for the appropriate policy responses. As we show, restricting leverage or regulating margins (see Geanakoplos (2010) ) are not enough to stabilize the system. Financial institutions will divert funds from safer projects to riskier ones to meet the increased haircuts. Creditors will not penalize them to the expected extent, since their expectations have been boosted as well. This is the underlying reason why commonly used measures, such as VIX or the TED spread, failed to capture the building up of risk before the crisis. They are very sensitive to prevailing expectations. A measure capturing the shift in portfolios holdings towards riskier projects would be more effective in capturing the credit cycle, given that projects' relative riskiness is preserved when expectations are boosted, although all of them may look safer.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model, while section 3 extends it to incorporate a credit market and default, and presents the implications for the leverage cycle. Sections 4 and 5 discuss possible policy responses and empirical implications of our approach. Section 6 concludes. Some figures and tables are relegated to the Appendix.
Baseline Model
Consider a multi-period economy with two financial institutions 3 , i ∈ I = {Γ, ∆}. At any date t, the economy can be in one of two states, denoted by u ("up"/good state) and d ("down"/bad state) respectively. For example, the "up" state at time t is denoted by s t = s t−1 u. The set of all states is s t ∈ S = {0, u, d, . . . , uu, ud, du, dd, . . . , s t u, s t d, . . .}. The probability that a good state occurs is constant at any point in time and denoted by θ. For simplicity we assume that θ ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 } with 1 > θ 1 > θ 2 > 0. However, agents do not know this probability and try to infer to infer it by observing past realizations of good and bad states. Agents have priors Pr(θ = θ 1 ) and Pr(θ = θ 2 ) that the true probability is θ 1 or θ 2 respectively. Their subjective belief in state s t of a good state occurring at t+1 is denoted by π s t and that of the bad 1 − π s t . These probabilities depend on the whole history of realizations up to t. In other words, π s t = Pr s t (s t+1 = s t u|s 0 , . . . , s t ).
shock have intense effects due to fire-sales. In this paper, we argue that leveraging up is only one side of the problem. Increased holdings of riskier assets due to prevailing optimism accompanied by higher leverage is the main reason behind catastrophic events. 3 From now on we will refer to them as banks in the broad sense, since we do not model in any way the capital requirements that they face. 
project is more profitable if the good state realizes. Note that the expected returns and standard deviations for the two projects change over time due to the fact that expectations about the good state being realised change, while the ex-post payoffs are the same.
Given its capital, the bank can invest in only one type of project. In the baseline model we make the assumption that the two projects are mutually exclusive, indivisible and that every bank can only invest in one unit of a project in each period. We assume that the capital not used to fund new investments is returned to shareholders, and we do not include it in our baseline analysis. The reason that we are making these assumptions is that our focus lies in the conditions that have to hold for banks to switch from a safe investment to a riskier one, once some of the uncertainty is resolved and expectations about future returns are updated. We relax these assumptions in section 3, where we allow banks to form a portfolio of the two projects, use the capital they have accumulated from investment proceeds in previous periods and also leverage up through the credit market.
Each bank i ∈ I = {Γ, ∆} has the following payoff function in state s t : (2007) . This coefficient can be institution specific and is greater than zero. The higher it is, the more institutions try to outperform their competitors.
The expected payoff at date t and state s t is:
where E s t is the expectation in state s t , under the probability measure π s t , when the investment decision is made, E s tΠ i s k+1 We first find the upper limit for a bank's risk-aversion, such that it chooses to invest in one of the two projects and not hold onto its capital. The individual rationality constraint for bank b is:
We assume that the above condition for both banks' risk-aversion always holds, so there is positive investment at every point in time.
We consider two situations. In the first, banks do not have any strategic considerations, i.e. the relative performance coefficient for both is zero. They choose the project to invest in by comparing the expected utility coming from the two exclusive investments. In section 2.1, we show that banks will choose to invest in the riskier project only after a number of good realizations have occurred up to that point and expectations have been revised upwards. The minimum number of "up" movements depends on the risk-aversion of the bank and relative ranking of projects' payoffs. Once we allow for relative performance influencing their utility, banks act in a strategic way. Again they choose to invest in the project that maximizes their payoff, given the action of the competing bank, resulting in a Nash equilibrium, since there are strategic consideration due to the relative performance effect.
The strategy set of both banks is F = (L, H), since they can either invest in the safer or the riskier project. The equilibrium actions are those such that no bank has an incentive to deviate, given the optimal action of the other bank. We show in section 2.2 that, given a relative performance coefficient, banks will switch to the riskier project once expectations are revised upwards and that the number of good realizations necessary for such a switch are lower than in the case when banks do not compete with each other. Thus, relative performance and competition for higher expected returns exacerbate the problem of switching to riskier investments.
Banks do not compete for higher expected returns
We start with an assumption of a zero value for the relative performance coefficient of both banks.
The investment decision of the competing bank will not be taken into consideration when bank i decides in which project to invest. Thus, it will prefer to invest in the risker project in s t if its expected utility at s t is higher compared to that coming for the safer investment, i.e.
Given that the probability at t of the good state of the world occurring at t+1 is higher thanĀ, then bank i will choose to invest in the riskier project. The same holds for the other bank. Note than both the numerator and the denominator of the above expression are positive, since γ i is a positive number close to zero (usually between 0.05 and 0.2). Thus,Ā i < 1. Using expressions 1 and 2, we can calculate the minimum number of good realizations needed to make banks invest in the riskier project.
Proposition 1: Given that banks do not compete with each other (i.e. ω i = 0 ∀i ∈ I), bank i will choose to invest in the riskier project if the number of good realization before the time of the decision is n * with π s t (n * ) >Ā i , where t is the date that the decision is taken,Ā i is given by expression (2) and π s t (n) by expression (1).
Banks compete for higher expected returns
When banks compete with each other for higher returns, they do not evaluate their investment decisions solely on grounds of their individual return and risk profile, but also take into consideration their profitability in comparison with the profitability of their competitors. Thus, strategic considerations become important and one has to resort to a game-theoretic approach. We first list the payoffs to bank i from choosing one project or the other given the investment decision of bank i .
For any choice of project j by bank i , bank i will choose to invest in the safer project and will not have an incentive to deviate if:
Proposition 2: For a given risk-aversion and distribution of returns, there exists anω i after which bank i chooses to invest in the riskier project
Proof. The result derives directly from expression 3.
Proposition 3: For a given distribution of returns, the more risk averse a bank is the higher its relative performance coefficient has to be for it to invest in the riskier project.
Proof. The derivative ofω i in expression (3) with respect to the risk aversion coefficient, γ i , is positive. Hence, the more risk averse banks are the higherω i is. This means that if banks are very risk averse the competition among them for higher returns has to be very high for them to invest in the riskier project.
Proposition 4: For a given risk-aversion, when expectations about project returns become more optimistic, it is more profitable for a bank to deviate to the riskier project.
Proof. Assume that at time t-1,ω i is marginally higher than the relative performance coefficient ω i .
We need to show that if expectations become more optimistic, i.e. the good state of the world is realized at time t, thenω i decreases for the investment decision at that point in time. This means that banks that invested in the safer project at t-1 will choose to invest in the risker project after they have revised their expectations upwards. We need to calculate the derivative ofω i with respect to the probability of the good state occurring. For ease of notation, we will denote this probability by π.
Expanding the expression forω i we get:
The derivative of the above expression with respect to π is:
> 0 the derivative is negative, which means thatω i decreases when expectations become more optimistic.
The next step is to examine whether relative performance and competition for higher expected returns result in banks choosing the riskier project even if expectations are revised upwards less than in the case that there were no strategic considerations. When ω i > 0 expression 2 becomes:
Proposition 5: Given that banks compete with each other, bank i will choose to invest in the riskier project after a lower number of good realizations compared to the case when there is no competition, i.e. n * ω i < n * where n * ω i is the minimum number of good realizations to deviate to the riskier project when ω i > 0.
Proof. Following the proof of proposition 1 bank i will invest in the riskier project after n * ω i good realisations, where π s t n *
ω is given by expression (4) and π s t (n) by expression (1). For n ω i to be less than n,Ā i ω has to be less thanĀ i . We can just calculate the derivative ofĀ i ω with respect to ω i . After some algebra we find that ∂A i ω ∂ω i < 0.
A Model with access to the Credit Markets
In this section, we enhance the baseline model to include access to credit markets for fund raising, and introduce budget constraints at each point in time. We will consider three time periods, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, to capture the dynamic structure and portfolio reallocation. As before, one of the two states of the world (up or down) can realize at t=1 and t=2. The amount of funds available for investment by banks is equal to the equity capital, plus the funds borrowed from credit markets, plus the profits from the previous period's investment than are not distributed as profits and consumed.
We relax the assumption that the projects are mutually exclusive and that bank can only invest in one unit, and we consider a general portfolio problem under which banks decide how much of the available funds to invest in the safer project and how much in the riskier one. We denote by w We allow for default in the credit market. The amount repaid is an endogenous decision by bank i, which weighs the benefits from defaulting against a deadweight loss. The latter is assumed to be a linear function of the amount that the bank chooses not to deliver. Denoting by 1 − v i s t , s t ∈ {u, d, uu, ud, du, dd} the percentage default, the deadweight loss is equal to
where λ is the default penalty and r s t−1 the interest rate set at the node preceding state s t (for s t ∈ {uu, ud}, s t−1 = u, for s t ∈ {du, dd}, s t−1 = d and for s t ∈ {u, d}, s t−1 = 0). We assume risk-neutral creditors. Thus, the interest rate will be inversely related to their expectation about future percentage delivery. The amount of funds that bank i chooses to borrow is denoted by w Allowing for default and variable portfolio weights, we can examine the interaction between Minsky's financial instability hypothesis and the leverage cycle. Once expectations become more optimistic, banks will reallocate their portfolios towards the riskier asset. In order to fund their position, they will increase their leverage, since they cannot go short in the safer asset. This allows us to analyse the effect of expectations on leverage and subsequently default. Once uncertainty is resolved, banks need to repay their loans and they are confronted with the decision to default. If realisations turn out to be bad after a period of previously good news, they will default more on their loans, since they would have invested more in the riskier asset. This is the core of argument, which follows Minsky's intuition. One might have expected that creditors would reduce their credit extension and leverage would go down, since loss given default would be higher. However, this is not the case since the probability of a good outcome has increased and consequently the interest rate creditors charge is lower. This allows banks to increase their leverage after a period of good realizations and invest more in the riskier project.
The leverage cycle has been studied by Geanakoplos (2003 Geanakoplos ( , 2010 and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) via the modelling of collataralised loans. Herein, we follow an alternative approach to modelling default using non-pecuniary default penalties. 5 We do so for analytical simplicity and because our focus is not on margins, spirals and fire-sales, which have been extensively studied in the lit- Sections 3.1 and 3.2 describe the model here, and section 3.3 defines the equilibrium. Due to the dynamic nature and the complexity that default introduces, we resort to simulations to show our results. In order to do so we choose (the few) exogenous parameters carefully to get realistic results for the equilibrium variables. Section 3.4 lists the choice of the exogenous parameters and discusses the resulting equilibrium. We have also performed comparative statics with respect to the most important exogenous parameters, which in our view are the probability of a good realization after a period of good news and the relative performance coefficient. The dynamics of the endogenous variables are qualitatively equivalent to those of the baseline model presented in section 2. However, our richer framework allows us to examine the interaction between leverage and expected loss given default.
Bank i's Optimization Problem
Banks want to maximize their expected utility over time. At t=0 and t=1 they decide how much to leverage up and how much to spend on the two projects. We assume that the utility at t=1 comes only from the relative performance. Under this assumption banks will not distribute (in essence consume) any profits, but will rather retain them and reinvest them. At t=2, the economy comes to an end, when banks then enjoy the utility coming from their profits and their relative performance.
Both at t=1 and at t=2 they choose how much to repay on the loan they undertook in the previous period. Given default, they will have to suffer a non-pecuniary penalty. This penalty is modeled as a negative linear term in the utility function. Banks are penalized proportionally to the amount of loan they default on and the marginal penalty for each unit of default is equal to λ s t . 6 Bank i ∈ I want to maximize its life time expected utility.
under the following budget constraint at each point in time 7 :
i.e. investment in the safer and the riskier assets ≤ initial capital + leverage at t=0
i.e. investment in the safer and the riskier projects ≤ reinvested profits + leverage in s t ∈ {u, d}
i.e. distributed + retained profits ≤ safer and riskier investments' payoff -loan repayment in s t ∈ {u, d}
i.e. distributed profits ≤ safer and riskier investments' payoff -loan repayment in s t ∈ {uu, ud, du, dd}
where:
i.e. utility at t=1 depends only on relative performancẽ
i.e. utility at t=2 is equal to the sum of the utility coming from profits and relative performance
i.e. the return in s t ∈ {u, d} is the investments' payoff minus loan repayment over the initial capital
i.e. the return in s t ∈ {uu, ud, du, dd} is the investments' payoff minus loan repayment over reinvested capital Note that due to the specification ofŨ Optimizing with respect to credit extension, we get the following expression that connects the interest rate with the expected delivery on the loan.
For example, 1 + r u = 1
. One can observe the reverse relationship between the interest rate and expected percentage delivery. When the latter increases, the interest rate charged falls. This provides some intuition for the seemingly counterintuitive result that when expectations are optimistic, banks increase their leverage due to lower interest rates, though at the end their percentage repayment is lower and default is higher. The result obtains from the fact that the probability that a good state realizes is higher, since expectations are optimistic. Thus, overall expected delivery is higher, though loss given default is higher as well.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium is reached when creditors and banks optimize given their constraints and the credit and We say that (η, (2 i ) i∈I ), (2 c ) c∈C is an equilibrium of the economy E = c i ,
if and only if: 
Quantitative analysis
Given the complexity arising from short-sales constraints, i.e. that banks can only go long on the projects, relative performance and default, we were unable to get a closed form solution and resorted to a numerical calibration. Moreover, learning adds additional complexity to the problem. The choice of exogenous parameters is in line with our assumptions about the evolution of beliefs and the riskiness of the two projects, as outlined in section 2. We have also made sure that resulting interest rates for credit extension and expected default levels are reasonable. In particular, we assume that agents have a initial belief that the good state will realize in the intermediate period with probability π 0 = 0.82. Given a good realization at t=1, the (subjective) probability of a good outcome increases to π u = 0.87, while it falls to π d = 0.59 after a bad realization. 8 The safer project's payoff in the good state is X Table 1 presents the choice of the exogenous variable. We present the equilibrium values for the endogenous variables in table 8 in the Appendix and proceed with discussing the most important ones, which capture the interaction between Minsky's hypothesis and the leverage cycle.
Minsky and the leverage cycle
The main result we presented in section 2 that banks reallocate their portfolios towards the riskier asset once expectations become more optimistic holds in the more complicated version of the model as well. However, we now now able to examine the effects on leverage, interest rates and most importantly default, which is (or should be) at the heart of any financial instability analysis.
In the initial period banks choose not to invest any capital in the risky project. The same holds for the intermediate period when a bad state realizes. However, once expectations are updated upwards (the economy moves to the good state in the intermediate period) the bank starts investing in the riskier project. Actually, its portfolio weight on it is more than one and a half times the weight on the safer project ( Table 2 ). The increased holdings of the riskier asset in state s t = u are financed by an increase in leverage.
Holding of the safer project increase as well. In particular, as shown in table 3, borrowing more than doubles once good news materialize. Although the good state realized in the intermediate period and banks portfolio investment yielded high profits, they choose to borrow more and switch to riskier investments. An increase in borrowing is facilitated by a decrease in the interest rate charged, which falls by 19.02%. Although the bank leverages up and undertakes riskier projects, the interest rate falls, since expectations about a good outcome are more optimistic. Expected percentage default goes down, but inevitably loss given default is much higher once the bad state realises at t=2. Percentage default and loss given default are higher when prosperity prevailed in the past than in the case that a bad outcome materialized. In particular, we find that percentage default in state s t = ud is 56.02% compared to 22.93% in state s t = dd and 50.51% in state s t = d. A puzzling thing to note is that leverage increases in state s t = d as well, but less than in state s t = u. However, this is not completely counterintuitive, since in the former procceds from investment in the previous period are lower, thus the bank needs to increase its leverage to invest in new projects. Recall that the probability of good realizations is still high (π d = 0.59), thus creditors are willing to extend credit as long as they are compensated with a higher interest rate. Hence, banks will be inclined to default as a percentage less in state s t = dd than in state s t = d, though loss given default is higher as expected. The interest rate at s t = d is already higher due to bad expectations, thus by defaulting less they are facing a lower cost of leveraging. However, to do so they invest only in the safer asset.
The most important result of our analysis is that loss given default in state s t = ud is substantially higher than in any other state as shown in table 3. Optimism allowed banks to leverage up with low interest rates and undertake much riskier projects, which eventually can result in a catastrophic scenario. This is not the case when bad news realize in the intermediate period and expectations are not boosted upwards. 
Comparative Statics
We proceed with presenting the effects of the most important, to our view, shocks. These are an increase in the probability of a good outcome and an increase in the relative performance coefficient (in accordance to section 2.2) after a good realization in the intermediate period.
We have performed a number of other comparative statics, such as a decrease in risk-aversion and an increase in the initial banking capital. The results are not presented herein but are available upon request.
Increase in the probability of a good outcome
The equilibrium is very sensitive to changes in π u . We consider a 1% shock in θ 1 , which is the upper limit for the perceived probability of the good state occuring (see section 2). This shock will affect all probabilities due to Bayesian updating. In particular, π 0 and π u go up by 0.96% and 1.01%
respectively, while π d decreases by 1.67% in relative terms. The reason that π u increases more than π 0 is that in state u agents are more optimistic; thus a higher upper bound will affect the probability more. On the other hand, agents become more pessimistic in state d after the realization of bad news, thus the probability of a good outcome decreases. The prospects for the economy are better in state s 1 = u, thus banks shift their portfolio towards the riskier project even more. Portfolio holdings of the riskier asset increase by 3.87% compared to the initial equilibrium. What is striking is that the ratio of the riskier portfolio holdings over leverage goes up by 14.92%. Naturally, this would push default up. Expected default in s t = u increases by 1.75%. The increase in optimism is not enough to outweigh the default stemming from the fact that banks have over-leveraged. This is captured by percentage default, which goes up by 9.36% (a 5.24% gross increase). Nevertheless, loss given default decreases by -1.02%. The reason is that leverage goes down as it was expected. Since expected default increases, creditors acting rationally charge a higher interest rate, which makes banks reduce their loans they take and shift funds from the safer investment to finance the riskier one.
Naturally, the improved economic outlook at t=0 induces banks to invest more in the safer asset by increasing their leverage. What allows banks to borrow more is the lower interest interest rate due to better expectations. Increased holding should result in higher percentage default and loss given default, since leverage went up. However, this is not the case. The reason is that the prospects of the economy in state d have deteriorated. The perceived probability of a good state realizing in the final period then goes down by 1.67%. Banks, when comparing the benefits from defaulting and invest more in that state versus repaying and reducing the size of their portfolio, choose the latter.
Thus, they decrease their investment in the safer asset in state d by 2.37%. Naturally, loss given default goes down. But, expected default increases, since the prospects of the economy in state d are now worse than before. It should be noted that the leverage cycle interpretation of our model described in section 3. 
Increase in the relative performance coefficient
Increasing the relative performance coefficient is equivalent to assuming that banks compete more strongly for relatively higher expected returns on their portfolios. To perform a meaningful comparative static, we first elaborate on proposition 5, which says that banks switch to the riskier project faster when their relative performance coefficient is higher. The baseline model does not provide a straightforward implication for the change in portfolio weights due to its simplicity. In this section, we extended the model to account for access in the credit markets and generalized portfolio holdings, which go beyond the case of just two mutually exclusive investments. In our simulation, banks start investing in the riskier project after a round of good news. When banks become more competitive they face a trade off. On one hand, they desire higher expected returns and want to invest more in the riskier asset once expectations allow it. On the other hand, this gives rise to higher default, thus banks would be penalized with a higher interest rate resulting in lower borrowing.
The boosted expectations in state u support positive investment in the riskier project for values of ω lower than 0.1 in accordance with proposition 1. A meaningful comparative static would be to shock the relative performance coefficient after expectations have been updated upwards and examine the change in the riskier portfolio holdings. As expected, a decrease in the relative performance coefficient result in a decrease in risk-taking behaviour in state u. Changes in the equilibrium variables for different levels of shocks in the relative performance coefficient are presented in table 7 (comprehensive comparative statics results for all endogenous variables are present in table 9 in the Appendix).
Investment in the riskier project falls by 0.1% with a reduction of 1% in the relative performance coefficient. The trend is the same for bigger reductions in the coefficient. This small change can be explained by looking at the change in the interest rate charged at s t = u and in the level of leverage. The former decreases by 0.46%, which allows banks to increase their borrowing. Given that they have decreased their holdings of the riskier asset, expected default goes down due to creditors having rational expectations. Consequently, they will charge a lower interest rate and banks will be able to obtain more borrowing. Regardless of the small quantative impact on portfolio holdings, the channel through which decreased competion among banks for higher returns leads to lower expected default and loss given default exists. Expected default in s t = u decreases by 0.45% as does percentage default. Although expected default goes down, loss given default increases by 0.20% due to an increase in leverage backed by lower interest rates.
However, more intense competition, has mixed effects on risk-taking behaviour. A minor increase in the relative performance coefficient of 1% results in banks switching to the safer asset while reducing their leverage. The underlying reason is that they would have been penalized with a higher interest rate if they did not do so. The implicit punishment from the creditors increasing the cost of borrowing makes banks safer when they become marginally more competitive. As a result expected default and loss given default go down. However, this is not the case when competition becomes more intense. Consider for example a increase of 4% in the relative performance coefficient. Reducing risk-taking is now more costly for banks, since they care more about higher expected returns.
However, they are still penalized with a higher interest rate if they become more risky and thus have to reduce their borrowing even further. Given that they have fewer funds to invest they reduce their investment in both the safer and riskier projects. However, the reduction in the safer holding is bigger. Expected default increases due to higher risk-taking behaviour. A measure of this risk is the volatility of the portfolio, which increase by 0.25%. The relative performance channel seems to have shut down in state s t = u, since higher risk-taking if fully anticipated by creditors. Aggregate holding of the riskier project do not increase and loss given default decreases due to lower borrowing. Yet, risk-taking and expected default increase for higher levels of competition. This result may look inconsistent with proposition 5. However, it is not. In the equilibrium we examined, risk-taking behaviour and investment in the riskier project was already at high levels once expectations were boosted up. To show that the result of the model with access to credit markets is consistent with proposition 5, we start with an equilibrium corresponding to a much lower value for the relative performance coefficient keeping other exogenous variables constant. Aggregate holdings are much lower for a significantly lower coefficient ( figure   6 ). Moreover, risk-taking increases, though not monotonically, as the relative performance coefficient becomes higher. A measure of risk taking could be the volatility of the bank's portfolio.
However, we chose to construct another measure, which is presented in the following figure, 3.5.2.
It is the difference between riskier and safer holdings in aggregate terms per unit of leverage. We elaborate more on its advantages over other measures of riskiness, such as implied volatility, in section 5, when we discuss the empirical implications of our model. 
Policy Responses
The main driving force behind over-leveraging and increased risk taking is the optimism that comes after the realization of good news. The expectations formation mechanism is exogenous in our model and is implemented through Bayesian updating. Agents have incomplete information about the real world probability of a good state occurring and they try to infer it by observing past realizations. They are Bayesian learners. There is also no additional asymmetry of information. Every agent knows and observes the same things. Thus, regulation cannot control optimism in the markets.
Agents are rational and no institution has more information than them. Regulation cannot affect optimism, but it can control its consequences. Simplified as it is, our model can be used to evaluate regulatory policies to control the leverage cycle and mitigate excess risk-taking and default. The first type of policy is to enforce more severe default penalties for banks, while the second to control their leverage ratios in the good state of the world. We discuss this in turn. We use the equilibrium calculate in section 3.4.
Stricter Default Penalties
The fundamental reason that allows banks to invest largely on the riskier project after expectations have been updated upwards is that interest rates go down. Although loss given default is higher in bad outcomes, optimism dominates making expected default lower. Thus, banks are able to leverage up to invest in the risker project without having to reduce their investment in the safer one, the holdings of which increase as well. It looks like that banks are not penalized ex-ante with a higher interest rate due to optimistic expectations. The only penalty is due to default. Policy cannot affect the credit spreads, since they are market based and depend on expectations which follow an exogenous process. But, what policy can affect is the propensity to default by changing the default penalty. 9 To visualize the effects of stricter regulation on leverage and risk-taking, we increase the default penalty when agents become more optimistic, i.e. state u.
As expected, loss given default in stat ud goes down (figure 6). Banks find it too costly to default.
On the other hand, expectations are boosted and banks have an incentive to increase their holdings of projects that seemed riskier until then. Weighing the future benefits of this together with a higher cost of default in state ud, they decide to reduce their borrowing in state u. Since their available for investment funds decrease, they find it more profitable to default more on the loan undertaken in the initial period. Percentage default go up, as does the interest rate at t=0, and this results in lower borrowing in the initial period as well ( figure 6 ).
The last has adverse consequences for percentage default and loss given default when the very bad state dd realizes. Given that banks reduced their leverage in the initial period and the payoff from their investment is now lower in state d, their available funds in the latter state reduce a lot. Thus, they resort to higher borrowing, which results in higher percentage default and loss given default (figure 6). Due to higher expected default the interest rate increases as well to mildly demotivate banks from taking on more debt ( figure 6 ). Increasing the default penalty once expectations have been updated upwards is effective to reduce excessive default in state ud. But this comes at the cost of increasing default in the very bad state of the world. Banking profits do not change much apart from state ud, where the reduction is substantial (6) . This may seem insignificant within our model, but consideration for recovery after a bad shock following good realizations come into the picture.
Our main consideration is that policy cannot affect default penalties in the straightforward way described here. As mentioned, they rely a lot on market reaction and market discipline. Moreover and most importantly, default penalties are really hard to quantify. Their presence is implicit and necessary, but their level is not directly observable. This is partially the reason that policy has concentrated of different types of regulation, such as capital requirements. We turn to these policy measure in the following section.
Leverage Requirements
An alternative suggestion would be to restrict leverage once the good state of the world realizes in the intermediate period. A leverage requirement can take the form of a maximum ratio of borrowing over the total investment in projects. We show that such a requirement achieves the exact opposite result than hoped. That is, it results in increased loss given default in state ud instead of bringing it down (figure 6). The intuition is simple. Banks will divert their own funds away from the safer asset and put them to the riskier one. Although borrowing goes down, they will invest even more in the riskier asset to compensate for the loss in gearing, since expectation are optimistic (figure 6).
Geanakoplos (2010) proposes a similar policy response to control the leverage cycle. In particular,
he argues that the regulator should control haircuts in the upturn, where they are naturally low, in order to allow less room for banks to leverage up and invest in risky projects. But, banks can again reduce their leverage, divert their own resources away from the safer projects and invest more in the riskier ones, while at the same time meeting a higher haircut requirement.
It is exactly such a situation that capital requirements in the Basel Accords try to avoid by imposing requirements on equity capital over risk-weighted assets. The idea is that the requirement becomes tighter if banks invest in riskier asset, since risk-weighted asset should go back. However, there are two crucial drawbacks. The first is present in both Basel I and II and has to do with the fact that equity capital is higher after good realizations due to the higher payout of previous investments.
The second is connected with the procyclicalty inherent in Basel II. 10 When expectations become more optimistic, risk-weights decrease and the capital requirement is less tight. This hold for both safer and riskier asset. Thus, a capital requirement of this kind would not restrict leverage to the intended extent once expectations become more optimistic. In the following section, we propose a requirement that is successful in restricting risk-taking behaviour.
An alternative requirement
Our analysis highlights that the adverse consequences of the leverage cycle depend on financial institutions shifting their portfolios towards previously riskier projects due to the fact that beliefs have been updated upwards. Since leverage also goes up, this results in a more fragile financial system.
In the previous sections, we showed that requirements on leverage when market expectations are high, exacerbate the problem instead of mitigating it. The reason is that financial instituitions will divert funds from safer to riskier projects in the presence of borrowing constraints.
We propose another requirement to control the adverse effects of the leverage cycle. Policy could restrict relative portfolio holdings. In particular, a requirement on the difference between riskier and safer holdings per unit of leverage results in higher financial stability. The intuition is straigthforward. As already mentioned, it is the shift towards riskier projects in combination with high leverage that creates the problem, which is something that leverage requirements by themselves cannot handle. Also, restricting leverage in good times can be harmful for the economy and banking profits.
It is leverage that goes directly to risky investment which is the appropriate variable to control. We choose to create a requirement that is based the difference between riskier and safer holdings, as financial institutions can relax their constraint by investing more in safer projects, which can be desirable for the economic activity in good times.
Our comparative statics exercise suggests that loss given default goes down with stricter requirements of this type ( figure 6 ). Also, percentage default goes down in every state of the world ( figure   6 ). Finally, the results verify the intuition that what decreases are riskier holding, while safer ones and borrowing increases to contribute to higher economic activity and a more stable fiancial system (figure 6). According to the arguments in this paper, after periods of prolonged prosperity and optimism about future prospects, financial institutions invest in riskier assets, which can make the economic system more vulnerable in the case that default materializes. Minsky's analysis can be used to identify the point in the leverage cycle.
Empirical Implications
In particular, we constructed a theoretical model to highlight the variables that can be used to construct such an index. In our framework, as expectations become more optimistic due to good realization, banks start investing in riskier projects and increasing their leverage. Although the loss given default increases under a riskier portfolio composition, expected default and credit spreads reduce, since the expectation effect dominates. This suggest that not only credit growth, but also portfolio switches to riskier projects should be used to identify the point in the leverage cycle in combination with lower (ex-ante) risk premia.
indicator of banking distress, and combinations of credit and asset price deviations from long-term trends are considered to be even better (Borio and Lowe (2002) , Borio and Drehmann(2009) An important element of the identification strategy is expectations formation. The effectiveness of capturing the time-varying transition probabilities between good and bad regimes should be the main objective in model selection for empirical work. One of the conjectures that can be tested is that the riskiness of the financial system increases as people become more optimistic. Another is the empirical testing of the relative performance effect. That is, when banks compete more with each other for higher expected returns, then they switch to riskier assets only after a few realizations of good news. This will provide some evidence that not only credit, but also the structure of the financial sector and the level of competitive behavior, determine the leverage cycle.
Measuring the riskiness of banking portfolios or of the financial sector as a whole over the leverage cycle is not an easy task. As highlighted in this paper, although banks engage in more risky behaviour after a period of good realizations, this results from expectations becoming more optimistic. Commonly used measures to capture risk building up, such as the volatility of banking assets or credit spreads, fail to do so due to the fact that they are biased by optimistic expectations. It is evident that market volatility as measured by the VIX index was below its long-term trend before the financial crisis. The same holds for the TED spread, i.e. the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term US government debt ( figure 5 ).
The index we propose is the difference between riskier and safer portfolio holdings per unit of leverage. Once expectations become optimistic riskier projects are perceived less risky. But the same holds for safer ones, which are assessed as even more safe. Although absolute riskiness goes down for both types, their ranking is preserved. Consider for example risk weighted assets (RWAs)
as defined by the Basel Accord II, under which risk weights follow an Internal Rate approach and change over the cycle. As mentioned, the literature on procyclicality has shown that all risk weights go down in good times. Thus, RWA do not increase as much as they should when banks shift their portfolio towards projects previously regarded as risky. Actually, RWA overall tend to go down as empirical data suggest (figure ??). This issue disappears once we consider the difference between projects with a higher and lower risk-weight, since their relative ranking should remain. Finally, we normalize by leverage, because it is default on debt that causes a financial crisis, tightening in credit and forced liquidations that lead to fire sales externalities. In the following diagram (fig. , we simulate our model for different levels of optimism and show how the proposed index can predict risk-taking and financial instability where the aforementioned and commonly used volatility measure fails. As a proxy for VIX we calculate the volatility of banking portfolios.
Conclusions
We argue that the perceived risk profile of investment opportunities changes over time. Financial agents are Bayesian learners and update their beliefs about future good realisations by observing the sequence of past ones. After a prolonged period of good news, expectations are boosted and financial instituions find it profitable to shift their portfolios towards projects that are on average riskier, but promise higher expected returns. Creditors are willing to provide them with funds, since their expectations have improved as well. As a result, leverage increases, risk premia go down and banking portfolios consist of relatively riskier projects. When bad news realise, default is higher and the consequences for financial stability are more severe.
We also explore the effect of higher competition among financial institutions for higher expected returns. We show that they will shift their portfolios towards riskier assets faster, compared to the case that there are no strategic considerations. This channel is mitigated by higher borrowing costs, since creditors rationally expect this behaviour.
Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of different policy responses. Making default most costly can stabilise the leverage cycle. This is subject to two considerations; how rigid regulatory penalties are and whether policy can affect market based penalties, such as loss of reputation. An alternative is to restrict leverage or equivalently regulate a minimum level of haircuts in good times. We show that such a response does not yield the desired outcome, since banks will divert funds form safer to riskier projects. Credit markets will allow this, since expectations are overall optimistic. We propose a different regulatory response, which is to restrict the difference between riskier and safer portfolio holdings per unit of leverage during good times. This measure has the advantage that it is not biased by optimistic expectations. Although the overall riskiness of both riskier and safer assets is perceived as decreasing, their relative riskiness on average should be preserved.
Finally, we use our theory to identify a potential reason for the failure of measures, such as VIX or the TED spread, to predict the catastrophic events after the August of 2007. These measures are sensitive to prevailing expectations and are biased when financial participants become more optimistic. 
